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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
DUDLEY M. AMOSS, I; 
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vs. Cases 
No. 
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and 
10482 
HEBER BENNION, JR., VERA 
W. BENNION, his wife, and BEN-
NION RANCHING COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendants-A ppeUants. 
\ 
ltespondent's Petition for Rehearing and 
Supporting Brief 
Appeal from the District Court 
UNJVERS1TY O~ UT AP. 
of Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, Judge JAN 1 3 1967 
Bryce E. Roe and 
Ralph L. Jerman 
LAW LIBRA8 
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510 American Oil Building 
,, . . . Salt Lake' City, Utah 84101 
btoii A. Oman and 
friist F; Baldwin, Jr. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ke City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SUPRENIE COURT 
OF THE SJ'ATE OF t:TAH 
DUDLEY l\I. Al\IOSS, ) 
Plain ti-ff-Res pond ent, 
Cases YS .. \ No. 
HEB.EH BENNION, JR., \TERA l' 1Z!~3 
\V. HJ:i~NNION, h~s wit'e, an1l BEN-
10482 NION RANCHING COl\IPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Def e11dru1 l8-, t p pell a ills. 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing and 
Sr1pporting Brief 
Dudley ~L Amoss, plaintiff and respondent, re-
ipectfully petitions the court for a rehearing on the 
following grounds: 
l. By failing to plead accord and satisfaction, or 
discharge b:, new contract, appellants waiYed the de-
frnse. 
1 
2. The enforceability of a compromise agreeme1tl 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
;_). In any event, appellants repudiated the agree-
ments and respondent was free to bring action 011 the 
original contract. 
I rr1 " • " ·j'. ie compromise agreement itself 'rnuld e11 . 
title respondent to an attorney's fee. 
Supporting Brief 
NATURE OF 'THE CASE 
This was an action by a purchaser to obtain spr· 
cific performance of an Earnest Money Receipt anrl 
Offer to Purchase relating to properties in Daggett 
County, Utah, and Sweetwater County, ~Tyoming. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
In its opinion on appeal this court held that the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase wai 
binding upon the parties to it, but that the purchase 
price provided in the Earnest l\loncy Agreement shou1t1 
1 
be increased by $17 ,500.00 bee a use of an oral comprn· 
mise agreement, and attorney's fees should be dcnic<l. 
RELIEF SOUGITT ON HEHEARING 
lifr 
The respondent seeks to have the court J11U(. · 
so much of its decision as increases tl11~ purchase pril'' 
[1>, $1 i,31HU.!:J and refuses to grant attorney's fees, and 
io affirm the j u<lgment of the trial court. 
STATElHENT OF FACTS 
The rnmplaint filed in the trial court was for the 
,pecific e11forceme11t of an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase, together with damages because of 
the defendants' failure to abide by the agreement, and 
an attorney's fee as provided in the contract. The ::m-
~1rer, in addition to specific denials, contained affirmative 
defenses of failure to state a claim, failure to mal"c 
payments, indefiniteness and uncertainty of the agree-
ment. and lack of contract mutuality. 
There was no contention in the answer or there-
after by any party that the oral compromise or accord 
was an enforceable agreement. Moreover, the oral agree-
ment, as well as the Earnest l\;loney Agreement, was 
repudiated by the defendants when they attempted to 
retake possession of the Bennion ranches on or about 
October 25, 1964. 
The effectiveness of the oral agreement was not an 
issue in the motion for summary judgment, the offer 
(Jf proof made by the defendants, the appellants' brief, 
the respondent's brief, or the reply brief. 
3 
1-\RG Ul\iENT 
I 
BY FAILING TO PLEAD ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION, OR DISCHARGE BY NEW 
CONTRACT, APPELL.i\NTS 'VAIVED THE 
DEFENSE. 
C nder the provisions of Rule 8 ( c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a pleader is required to set forth a.if'ir-
nwtively a number of def ens es: 
"In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmati,-cly accord and satisfac· 
lion, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankrupt· 
cy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegalit~', inj 11r~r hy fellow servant, lache~, 
license, payment, release, res j udicatai statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, ·waiver, and any 
other matter constitnting an avoidance or affir· 
mative defense:* * * " (Emphasis added) 
The rule is of ten a pp lied in conj unction with the 
provisions of Rule 12 (h), Utah Rules of Civil Pro· 
cedure, that: 
"A party waives all defenses and obj~ctions 
which he does not present either hy motw11 as 1 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply.*** " 
A recent case recognizing the waiver of such de· 
fenses under such circumstances is 1'.i;gesen v. 1lf aqna 
Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d .J.56 (1962) 111 
which the appellant, on appeal, contended that t!J1 
4 
l 
defendant was estopped from asserting a 30-day statute 
uf limitations, and that certain charges were excessive 
a!l(] unco11stitutional. The court said: 
"This point was raised for the first time on 
appeal and under familiar principles of appellate 
review, we do not canvass it. In any event it 
would appear the plaintiff waived tliis conten-
tion under Rules 8 ( c) and 12 (h), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." 
As pointed out in 1.A Barron & Holtzoff Federal 
Practice & Procedure (Rules Edition) ~ 279: 
"Rule 8 ( c) is a simple and effective require-
ment that a party responding to any claim for 
relief shall affirmatively allege any matter con-
stituting an avoidance or affirmab,,e defense. 
*** 
"Generally a failure to plead an affirmative 
defense results in a waiver of that defense and 
it is excluded as an issue in the case. * * * " 
II 
ENFORCEABILITY OF' THE COlHPRO-
U!SE AGREE~IENT CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TI.ME ON APPEAL. 
The present case differs considerably from Chene/; 
et al. v. Rucker et al., 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
(1963) in which the issue of the validity of a subsequent 
agreement had not been pleaded but evidence on the 
issue had been admitted by the trial court. There the 
eourt held that Rule 8 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
5 
cedure, did not prevent the raisiug of the issue bec;
1
u, 
of the pmver of the trial l'.ourt to permit amcrnliuc11 
at the trial, plaintiff not haviug moved fur conlinua11t" 
when the otherwise inadmissible e\ idenl'.c wa.'> aJmitted. 
This court and courts of other jurisdictions haw 
been harmonious in holding that affirmatin dei'e11,t\ 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Iu C11ro 
ct al. v. Douglas et al., 12 Utah 2d 424, am P.:2d lu~ 
( 1962), the appellants contended on appeal that a dai111 
had been lost by failure of the bankruptcy trnslt>t· l.11 
accept or reject a contract within the statutory penod. 
Commenting on this contention the court said: 
"It was not pleaded or proved at the trial lerel. 
Under such circumstances we have refused to 
canvass such contention.;; that are raised for the 
first time on appeal. This, in consonance with 
usual principles of appellate review." 
In Huber et al. v. Deep Creek Irrir;ation Cu. et 11/., 
6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (19.56), the appellants, on 
appeal, claimed that the plaintiffs had faile(l to estabfoi: 
a right to use of water by failing to show that the land 
did not carry the burden of water which it had been 
allocated. Commenting on this point the court said: 
"This contention was raisc<l for the first tillle 
on appeal, and we feel cow;trained uot to enter· 
tain it." 
In Tl)qesen v. Jlaqna 1Vatrr Co111pa11,1;, (Hl6~I 
. • ' ·l 
1:3 Utah 2d 3D7, 37.5 P.2d ~.56, cited supra, the coui 
. . d f' +I '1'1·"t time refused to consider two pomts raise or . 1e i ~ 
on appeal. 
6 
lu ChU1nney v. Stott et ux., 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 
P.~d 84 ( 19()3), defendant contended on appeal that 
a sales agreement was void as in contravention of the 
~talutes and coustitution of Utah. ln clisposinM· of the 
contention the court said: 
"This argument was not presented or discussed 
below, but is first urged on appeal. It is generally 
held, and this court has so held, that matters not 
raised in the trial court will not be considered 
on appeal. There does not appear to be any 
reason to depart froin this rule under the facts 
of the present case." 
The cases above cited are ones in which an appellant 
had sought to raise a particular issue for the first time 
on appeal and was precluded from doing so. In the 
instant case even appellants' brief, reply brief, and oral 
argument avoided any claim that the oral agreement 
was enforceable, and the case should not be disposed of 
on a ground never raised or argued by a party. 
III 
IN ANY EVENT, APPELLANTS RE-
PUDIATED THE .AGREEJHENT AND RE-
SPONDENT \VAS FREE TO BRING AC-
TION ON THE ORIGIN AL CONTH.ACT. 
The undisputed evidence in the case shows that 
' after the oral agreement of compromise was reached 
hr the parties it was repudiated by the appellants. On 
1
11
" ahont October 25, Hl64', the appeJlant Heber Tien-
7 
nion, .Jr .. attempted tu e\'ict ::VIr. Amoss frolll li:~ 
Bennion Ranches, which attempt led to the obtai 11 j1111 
~ 
of a temporary restraining order and preliminar~· j;
1
• 
junction. 
The e,·idence, taken all in all, supports the propr: 
sition that the oral agreement reached between Jlr. 
Amoss and .Mr. Bennion with respect tu i11crea~i11g 
the purchase price by $17 ,500.00 was an executor.1· 
accord, and that when the appellants repudiated an!· 
obligation to convey the property under any tenm 
whatsoever, the respondent was free to treat the agree· 
ment as rescinded and seek to recover on the origirnil 
agreement. See annotation, "Remedies for Breach 11 1' 
Y al id Accord or Compromise Agreement lnrnlring 
Disputed or Unliquidated Claim," 94 A.L.R. 2d 50L 
524. 
To the effect that for a total breach by one of th( 
parties, such an agreement might be regarded as rr· 
scinded, see Cheney et nl. v. Rucker ct al., H Utah Zrl 
20.5, 381P.2d86 (19t:i3), l'itcd supra, wherein thecourl 
said: 
"There may haw~ been some merit in plaintiffs 
contention tl~at he "·as entitled to rescind thr 
third contract am l snf' 011 the earnest monei; 
agreement if the trial r:ourt had hPlieved _thr thin' 
contract was condi1 ion0rl upon immechate per· 
f ormance. * * ·* " 
. l ·. , . patniith In the present case t 1e compronusc "as ' ~ · 
for the purpose of avoiding litigation, but its purpo)' 
failed. There wa~; a total breach br appellants of tlv 
8 
compromise agreement as well as the original agree-
ment. They absolutely refused to perform and repudi-
ated any obligation to do so. 
IV 
THE "CO.MPR01\1IISE" AGREE1\1IENT IT-
SELF 'YOULD ENTITLE RESPONDENT 
TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
The oral agreement compromised only the pur-
chase price, leaving the other terms of the contract the 
same. Included among the remaining provisions was an 
agreement by a non-performing party to pay "all ex-
penses of enforcing this agreement, or of any right 
arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee." 
The repudiation by appellants was a total breach 
and it was necessary for respondent to incur expenses 
to enforce the agreement. This is not analogous to an 
award of costs or attorneys' fees to a "prevailing party." 
. It is simply enforcement of a contractual promise. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
'j In iv c8t v. fVe8t, 16 Ut:ih ~cl n 1, 403 P.2d 22 
(1965), this court reversed findings of fact which were I out of harmony with the contentions of either party, 
! saying: 
9 
"Ordinarily findiHgs which are at variance 
with the claims of both parties are not favored 
and are carefullr scrutinized 011 review.'' 
In the instant case the trial judge, though not 
dealing with "findings" as such, heeded the court's ad-
monition and entered a judgment based upon the issues 
as made by the parties. It was proper for him to do so, 
and inasmuch as neither party has ever made a claim 
of reliance upon the compromise agreement, it shoulrl 
not he forced upon them. Ercu if the compromise agree· 
ment is given no effect, rcspo11dc11l, because of a change 
in the money market, has a bargain considerably less 
valuable to him than as originally made. 
A rehearing should therefore be granted, the judg· 
ment of the trial court should be affirmed as entered. 
and the case should be remanded for determination of 
an attorney's fee to be awarded to the plaintiff, and 
settlement of the other matters ref erred to in the original 
opmmn. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. HOE 
RALPI-I L. JEil~L:\N 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City. l_Tiah 
Altornc,1;:-; for Plui11ti/f-Respondenf 
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